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Abstract
Both the academy and industry believe that Intelligent Transportation System (ITS) would be achievable in one decade since modern vehicle and
communication technologies advanced apace. Vehicular Communication System (VCS) introduces information technology to the ITS and aims
to improve road safety and traffic efficiency. In recent year, security and privacy schemes in VCS are becoming important. However, recovery
mechanisms to eliminate the negative effect of security and privacy attacks are still an important topic for research. Therefore, the certificate
revocation scheme is considered as a feasible technique to prevent the system from potential attacks. The major challenge of the certificate
revocation scheme is to achieve low-cost operation since the communication resources must be capable of carrying various applications apart
from the security and privacy purposes. In this paper, we propose an efficient certificate revocation scheme in VCS. The Blockchain concept
is introduced to simplify the network structure and distributed maintenance of the Certificate Revocation List (CRL). The proposed scheme
embeds part of the certificate revocation functions within the security and privacy applications, aiming to reduce the communication overhead and
shorten the processing time cost. Extensive simulations and analysis show the effectiveness and efficiency of the proposed scheme, in which the
Blockchain structure costs fewer network resources and gives a more economic solution to against further cybercrime attacks.
Keywords: , Certificate Revocation, Low-cost Framework, Blockchain, VCS, ITS
1. Introduction
In recent years, the combining of vehicle and network com-
munication technologies keeps pushing the boundary of the nex-
t generation vehicles, also known as Intelligent Transportation
Systems (ITS). Vehicles and ITS infrastructures play the role
of physical units, while the Vehicular Communication System-
s (VCS) is the network platform of ITS. Infrastructure access
points in VCS are called Road Side Units (RSUs) [1]. Tra-
ditional VCS is comprised of multiple RSU cells and offers a
platform among ITS for vehicles to exchange various kinds of
messages such as safety beacon messages. With the help of
VCS, the vehicle becomes a platform which could receive in-
formation from its peers. For this reason, the environment and
ITS can offer safer and efficient traffic management. Moreover,
commercial applications, such as electric vehicle charging [2]
can be implemented on a dedicated platform. A recent report
from U.S Department of Transport (DoT) shows that 82% of
the accidents can be prevented by using ITS systems [3].
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Applications in VCS are normally classified into Vehicle-
to-Vehicle (V2V) and Vehicle-to-Infrastructure (V2I) [4]. The
VCS security highly relies on the exchange of safety beacon
messages. These beacon messages are usually referred to as
Cooperative Awareness Messages (CAMs) in Europe [5] or Ba-
sic Safety Messages (BSMs) for US [6], as they enable other
vehicles to be aware of their surroundings. Vehicles located in
the same RSU cell form a group and the current traffic situation
is generated based on the summary of safety beacon broadcast
from other group members [7]. The problem of providing ITS
security can be mapped into the problem of how to maintain
the trustfulness and legality of safety beacon messages among
the communicating participants. However, the ITS security can
be compromised if an authenticated node suddenly launches at-
tacks. Admittedly, the VCS faces the risk of disclosing the sen-
sitive information about vehicles as many applications and ser-
vices make use of safety beacon messages. The safety beacon
message contains vehicle status information, such as identity,
location and other personal data. Even though significant de-
velopments about VCS security and privacy have taken place
over the past few years, revocation issues are still an open top-
ic for research. High mobility, large volume of vehicular nodes
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and heterogeneity networks pose different challenges compared
to the traditional mobile networks. For this reason, the securi-
ty robustness of VCS is maintained by introducing certificate
revocation to eliminate further attacks by insider attackers.
The earlier schemes introduce pseudonym and pseudony-
m certificate to protect VCS security and privacy [8]. Vehi-
cles carry a set of pseudonyms which are used under different
time periods in VCS communication. The safety beacon mes-
sages are sent using a pseudonym set, instead of the permanent
identity of the vehicle. The pseudonym set contains pseudon-
ym identity, pseudonym certificate and the corresponding key
pairs. The vehicle signs the beacon message with pseudonym
private key, attaches the pseudonym certificate and sends out
the beacon message. A pseudonym certificate is revoked if the
certificate owner involves in malicious behaviours and other n-
odes are informed about the revocation information. Most of
the current pseudonym based privacy preserving schemes use
Certificate Revocation Lists (CRLs) [9] [10] to distribute the
revocation information. To guarantee security and privacy, ve-
hicles are supposed to use each pseudonym set for a short dura-
tion and frequently switch to a new pseudonym. The US-based
VCS standard SAE J2735 [6] defines the pseudonym chang-
ing in 120 seconds or 1 km distance travelled (whichever stays
longer), while the EU standard ETSI TS 102.867 [11] recom-
mends changing pseudonyms every 5 minutes. This however
increases the revocation efficiency as the central manager must
revoke a malicious user by adding all its pseudonym sets to
the CRL, as the CRL becomes tedious along with the number
of revoked vehicle grows. Moreover, the CRL distribution and
updating procedures result in large message overheads.
In this paper, we propose a distributed framework for pro-
viding efficient certificate revocation service. The certificate
revocation should cover all the VCS nodes, therefore the revo-
cation in VCS relies on the coordination between infrastructure
and vehicle levels. The infrastructure and vehicle levels of the
framework are discussed separately.
(i) infrastructure level: As mentioned above, accountabil-
ity can be realised by distributing CRLs. However, the priva-
cy requirement is guaranteed by shuffling vehicles pseudonyms
regularly. This brings additional difficulty for the central man-
ager to track the ownership of pseudonyms. The central man-
ager should be able to update the mapping relationships be-
tween the permanent identity of vehicles and pseudonyms in
order to maintain both privacy and accountability requirements.
Therefore, a novel Blockchain [12] concept is introduced into
the proposed framework to maintain and distribute CRL un-
der distributed consensus among all the infrastructure partici-
pants [13]. Blockchain technology was previously proposed to
simplify the network structure and accelerate key handover be-
tween security domains. The pseudonym shuffling is realised
by using the Blockchain distributed consensus, instead of man-
aged by the central manager. The pseudonym shuffling results
are recorded in blocks (distributed ledger). The central manag-
er in our proposed scheme uses the recorded block to reveal the
mapping between the permanent identity and pseudonym sets
of malicious users. In this way, the Blockchain system speeds
up the processes of accountability function among infrastruc-
tures.
(ii) vehicle level: Within the vehicle level, the revocation
is achieved by deleting the malicious users from the communi-
cation group instead of broadcasting CRL. Thus the broadcast
overhead is much less than the traditional revocation schemes.
A lightweight CRL-based revocation scheme is proposed to re-
voke the vehicle’s access authority. Different from central man-
ager distributing the CRL to all the vehicles via RSUs in the
traditional methods, the scheme only broadcasts CRL to RSU
level. The revocation is delivered along with the group key
management procedures by not distributing group key to the
malicious vehicle. The vehicle level revocation relies on the
key management updating scheme in [14]. Malicious vehicles
are excluded from the communication group according to the
revocation list using the key management scheme.
The remainder of this paper is organised as follows: Sec-
tion 2 briefly introduces the existing certificate revocation tech-
niques and the novel Blockchain applications. The model struc-
ture overview, a comparison between Blockchain and tradition-
al structure and details of our scheme are discussed in Section
3. The proposed certificate revocation scheme is introduced in
details afterwards. The scenario set up and performance eval-
uation are demonstrated in Section 5. Section 6 concludes the
paper and presents some future plans.
2. Related Work
In this section, we present the overview of the characteris-
tics of any related techniques which is used in this paper. Bloc-
kchain concept and the related applications are discussed in the
first place. Then we introduce pseudonym changing schemes
in order to clarify the reason why we need Blockchain to as-
sist certificate revocation. Blockchain concept and the related
applications are discussed. A brief literature review about the
previous works on certificate revocation schemes is illustrated
afterwards.
2.1. Blockchain and Blockchain-based Applications
Nowadays, Bitcoin attracts a lot of attention along with it-
s blockchain concept, which was proposed in 2008 [12]. The
popular feature of Blockchain is that all the nodes distributed
maintain an authenticated, shared and well-recorded transaction
ledger. By not using central manager, the Blockchain system
manages to ask all network participants to denote computation
power to proofread transactions correctness and integrity. The
authenticated transactions are recorded in the public ledger that
every node in the network has a copy and is able to easily ver-
ify it. Hence the accountability is approved in the Blockchain
by looking up previous blocks [15]. In addition, security and
privacy of the blocks are protected by using consensus algo-
rithm, such as the Proof-of-Work (PoW) [16]. The distributed
network structure makes the Blockchain system achieve better
robustness to against network failure which is caused by nodes
disconnection. However, 51% attack is still a potential prob-
lem for Blockchain applications as it might allow an attacker to
control the operation of entire network [16].
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Another consensus algorithm that worth to be mentioned
is the Proof of Elapsed Time (PoET) which was developed by
Intel. The PoET generates a random back-off time and attach-
es cryptographic receipt behind the message. The receipt is to
prove that the back-off time was calculated under legal ways
and a new block can only be broadcasted after the back-off
time. PoET gives less computation burden but might cause
longer time for blocks to join the network. Moreover, PoW
is the most reliable consensus mechanism that has been test-
ed in a sustained manner in an adversarial environment, and is
the only known cryptographic puzzle that meets these testing
requirements. Consensus mechanisms like PoET have not yet
been tested in real and adversarial practice.
Researchers started to propose using blockchain not only
for decentralized currencies, but also for applications in Internet-
of-Things (IoT) scenarios [17] [18] [19]. Authors in [18] pro-
posed a new digital currency based on Bitcoin, that provides
better scalability and flexibility. Despite the fact that Blockch-
ain gains a lot of attention from banking, people also find Bl-
ockchain could improve existing system in different ways such
as trust management [20], insurance, electric vehicles charging
and car sharing services [19]. Our previous contributions [13]
[14] apply the Blockchain to VCS scenario. They focus on the
key management within infrastructure and vehicle levels, re-
spectively. Furthermore, the Blockchain in VCS has potential
developments on privacy and revocation applications.
2.2. Pseudonym Changing Schemes
Pseudonyms and pseudonym certificates aim to protect in-
formation privacy of the safety beacon messages [8]. Vehicles
are required to broadcast safety beacon messages using pseud-
onym sets instead of permanent identities. Each pseudonym set
is expensive as it is supported by the corresponding pseudonym
certificate and asymmetric key pairs to assure complete priva-
cy. These materials require high processing power to generate
and large storage space to store. It’s a heavy burden for the
central manager to generate multiple numbers of pseudonyms
and distribute them to vehicles. For this reason, the pseudonym
changing approaches are proposed to reuse the pseudonyms to
reduce the production cost of pseudonym sets [21].
Authors in [22] analyse the effectiveness of the pseudony-
m changing inside mixed zone. A mixed zone is an area that
all the nodes have similar movement conditions. The results
show the pseudonym changing within mixed zone improves the
privacy level if an attacker monitors less than half of the mix
zones within the network. Changing pseudonym at social spots
is discussed in [23] and [24]. The social spots are mixed zones
with unpredicted position and further reduce the chance to be
monitored by the malicious users. Vehicles decide the position
of mix zone according to the real-time conditions and exchange
their pseudonym sets. Paper [25] proposed a time-slotted ps-
eudonym pools for pseudonym changing. A new pseudonym
set is picked from the pseudonym pool to use whenever a new
time-slot starts. Vehicle decides whether to exchange pseudo-
nym with another vehicle depends on the speeds, headings and
positions information. This approach proposes to change pseu-
donym candidates among pseudonym pool before they actually
using them. A larger scale of pseudonym changing scheme is
illustrated in [26], the changing is achieved using a distributed
algorithm for shuffling pseudonyms among participated vehi-
cles. Authors use RSUs to shuffle the pseudonyms sets instead
of requiring vehicles to find similar movement partners. This
pseudonym shuffling scheme proves its feasibility to manage a
large number of pseudonym sets in the network.
The above pseudonym changing schemes cause frequent
changing of pseudonym certificates’ ownership. The original
ownership mapping between pseudonym sets and permanent i-
dentities changes whenever a pseudonym changing scheme is
executed. This however increases the difficulty of accountabil-
ity service. We proposed to shuffle the used pseudonym sets
among edge nodes. The shuffling results are distributed decid-
ed by verifying the consensus outcome of Blockchain algorith-
m. Blockchain helps to broadcast the mined blocks as CRLs
and record the shuffling results. This aims to reduce the bur-
den of the central manager and schedule pseudonym shuffling
in a more efficient manner. More importantly, the central man-
ager updates the fresh mapping between pseudonym sets and
permanent identities by hearing the new blocks.
2.3. Certificate Revocation Schemes
The CRL-based schemes are the most widely used certifi-
cate revocation scheme which is proposed by lots of previous
contributions such as [9][10]. However the other approaches
are still worth to be discussed, including but not limited to the
Short-Lived Certificates [27] and Tamper-Proof Device (TPD)
schemes [28].
Short-Lived Certificates: The self revoked digital receipts
which only valid before it reaches the expire time [27]. Each
certificate is designed to have a field to show the valid time in
order to control the lifecycle of the certificate. The certificate
revocation is achieved by not issuing new certificates to the ma-
licious user. This approach is clearly not suited to the mobile
network, especially the VCS. Nodes are required to frequently
contact the central manager to update their certificates which
results in a huge amount of communication overheads. More-
over, the central manager will suffer from heavy computation
burden to generate new certificates.
Tamper-Proof Device: TPD is a hardware device on the
On-Board Unit (OBU) of vehicle which contains all the cryp-
tographic materials and operates cryptography and authentica-
tion actions [3][28]. The revocation process in the TPD-based
scheme is triggered by unicasting a revocation message to the
TPD of malicious vehicle. Revocation is achieved by deleting
the associated private keys so that the malicious can’t gener-
ate valid signatures. Although no CRL distribution is needed,
it still has two obvious disadvantages. First, TPD needs con-
siderable storage space of a large amount of pseudonym set-
s. Second, a compromised TPD may refuse to revoke all the
certificate. This causes other vehicles still trust the malicious
vehicle as they have no knowledge about the revocation list.
Certificate Revocation Schemes: The framework of CR-
L was proposed in [29], also known as X.509 CRL. The CR-
L scheme had been further discussed in [9][10]. X.509 CRL-
based schemes assume each node follows a copy of CRL which
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is issued by the central manager (e.g. Certificate Authority).
A certificate is considered as invalid if its digital identifier is
contained in CRL. The central manager is responsible to pe-
riodically distribute the revoked certificates in order to timely
update CRLs among the network. A format of CRL updating
message is illustrated in [30]. Three fields are important to the
CRL message readers, namely the list of revoked certificates,
the name of CRL issuer and the signature of CRL issuer. The
list of revoked certificates indicates the certificate identifier, re-
vocation reason and the expiry date which are used for nodes
to distinguish the validate of a certificate. Name and signature
of the issuer maintain the authenticity and integrity of the CR-
L message, ensuring the trustworthiness of the CRL message.
A node first checks the signature of CRL message when it re-
ceived a CRL message. The updated list of revoked certificates
is added to the local CRL of the node afterwards.
Unfortunately, The size of CRL becomes tedious with the
increasing number of revoked vehicles. Additionally, expired
certificates should be erased from local CRL. Authors in [31]
introduce hash chains to reduce the CRL size. A similar scheme
is proposed in [30], it broadcasts a lightweight CRL keychain
so that the receivers can calculate the revoked pseudonym cer-
tificates using hash chain. However, this scheme is designed
for smart meter scenarios since it has less mobility and a small-
er amount of nodes. Moreover, it can only revoke self generated
certificate but not the shuffled or exchanged pseudonym certifi-
cates from other vehicles. [32][33] both focus on the privacy p-
reserving authentication for VCS scenario. Part of the schemes
involves the procedures for vehicle revocation. However the
procedures only consider the revocation between VCS infras-
tructures, excluding the revocation methods within vehicles.
2.4. Threat Model
Attackers threat the system security by tracking some spe-
cific information with the periodic safety messages. The net-
work security aims to against both external and internal attacks.
To prevent the external passive attacks, either local or global,
messages are supposed to be encrypted using secret keys. Due
to the limited message receiving capability, the local adversary
analyses received safety messages from a small area in order to
retrieve safety and privacy related information. A global adver-
sary keeps listening and eavesdropping all the safety messages
from a wide coverage range of a vehicle network.
The accountability function in this paper major focus on in-
ternal attacks. It brings higher threat level comparing to the
external attacks as insider attackers are capable to touch and
participant in a larger proportion of the network information.
A compromised node could spoof safety messages and collab-
orate with other attackers to track and attack a specific vehi-
cle. An internal adversary could reuse pseudonyms which have
been allocated to others, allowing it to confuse the VCS and
to attack other nodes. The best way to against insider attack is
to revoke the malicious user when an attack happens because
its hard to entirely prevent the insider attack from the begin-
ning. Furthermore, adversaries in blockchain networks maybe
attempt to insert a false block into the blockchain. Due to the
nature of blockchain, its hard to achieve this attack as it requires
Figure 1. VCS Network Hierarchy [34]
at least 51% of the total blockchain network’s processing pow-
er.
2.5. Our Contributions
To the best of our knowledge, our previous schemes [13][14]
are the first time the Blockchain technology has been intro-
duced in VCS applications. Paper [14] illustrates a group key
management scheme which helps to distribute group key with
minimum message overhead. In [13], the edge node network
is used to solve key handover between security domains, rather
than forwarding keys to the central authorities. The key han-
dover time between heterogeneous security domains is com-
pressed by introducing the Blockchain structure.
A mature system requires both security and privacy and key
management only secure the security purpose. For this reason,
privacy is designed to be realised to use pseudonyms and shuffle
the pseudonyms regularly. In this paper, we extend our previous
idea to support accountability function. However, the difficul-
ties in traditional networks are the central manager is not capa-
ble to handle shuffling planning regularly and follow the correct
ownership mapping between the pseudonym sets and perma-
nent identities of vehicles. Because the Blockchain concept can
be generalised to further system to support accountability, we
introduced Blockchain aiming to solve both the problems as the
distributed property helps to against the problems. The Blockc-
hain plays the role of shuffling planning, shuffling plan distribu-
tor and shuffling result recording. The mid layer infrastructures
encapsulate used pseudonym sets into transactions, and the net-
work participants make effort to generate blocks regarding these
transactions. The shuffling planning is included in the process-
es of block preparation. In this way, pseudonym shuffling plans
are executed, distributed and stored in Blockchain for the par-
ticipant nodes to read, as well as for the central manager to up-
date the mapping between permanent identities and pseudonym
certificates. Additionally, the misbehaviours are reported to the
network by sending transactions with related information.
3. System Framework
3.1. System Model
Nodes in VCS are hierarchically classified into four layer-
s based on different responsibilities, namely central manager,
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Figure 2. Nerwork structures. (a) Traditional structure (b) Blockchain-based
structure
middle layer infrastructures, road side Access Points (APs) and
vehicles. Three layers on the side of service providers, while
the service user occupies a single layer [34]. As shown in Fig.1,
the service provider comprises Public Key Infrastructures (P-
KIs), Security Managers (SMs) and RSUs. The PKI plays the
central manager and contains Certificate Authority (CA), Law
Enforcement Agency (LEA) and other management infrastruc-
tures to support applications. All the security-related crypto-
graphic materials, such as secret key pairs, anonymous creden-
tial and pseudonym certificates are created by CA. The tasks of
LEA are mapping the pseudonym sets to the permanent identi-
ty and identifying all the pseudonym sets of the malicious user.
SMs are edge nodes logically below the PKI layer which help
PKI to manage cryptography materials. Each SM has their own
logical coverage area which is called the security domain. Thus
SMs are properly deployed in a geographically sparse manner
to handle individual security domain. RSUs act as APs which
offer interfaces to bridge messages between the service provider
and users. The RSUs have wireless communication devices
which can communicate over the wireless medium utilises VC-
S communication standards (The DSRC in US [3] or/and the
C-ITS in EU [35]).
Meanwhile, we assume that each vehicle is equipped with
a built-in computerised device known as OBU to support the
VCS standards. The vehicle will transmit and receive safety
beacon messages with other vehicles and RSUs. These safety
beacon messages are collected by RSUs that are built along the
road at regular intervals in order to provide maximum network
coverage (e.g. the radius of 300 meters in DSRC protocols).
The safety beacon message includes a pseudonym, a timestamp
and the current vehicle status (e.g. speed, orientation, position
and vehicle dimensions). The pseudonym is used to hide the
real identity of the vehicle so that the privacy purpose can be
guaranteed.
3.1.1. Traditional Network Structure
The traditional structure strictly follows the aforementioned
hierarchy. As shown in Fig.2(a), security domains are areas un-
der managing by different SMs and PKIs supervise the network
at the top level. The PKI is a trusted authority which provides
cryptographic keys, certificate and long-term identity to all le-
gitimate nodes and infrastructures. Each PKI manages multi-
ple numbers of SMs, the number depends on the geographical
topology of the area. Moreover, PKIs bridge the connections
between different security domains. Inspired by our previous
work [13], we introduce SM to cover the security function of
VCS. The RSU is a stationary device placed along the roads
and at intersections, which is used to gather information about
the road traffic and broadcasts it to the OBUs in communication
range. Also, an RSU can communicate with other RSUs and the
CA to exchange messages related to the road traffic through a
secure channel.
3.1.2. Blockchain Based Structure
Different from traditional network structure, PKI is isolat-
ed and would be a part of existing authority such as Driver and
Vehicle Licensing Agency, as shown in Fig.2(b). The PKI is
designed to dedicated generate cryptographic materials for all
the nodes and link the pseudonyms of vehicles to their long-
term identities. Cryptographic materials, such as vehicle iden-
tities, pseudonym certificates and the mapping relationship be-
tween pseudonyms and real identity, are supposed to be kept
in a secured facility to cope with the privacy and security pur-
poses [36]. Thus the central managers are accessed under the
following two situations. (i) Initial Registration. New vehi-
cles need to apply for the initial registration when they leave
the manufacturer and first participate in a new security domain.
(ii) Certificate Revocation. Vehicles are supposed to send mes-
sages using pseudonym. Therefore a compromised user could
use its pseudonym to launch malicious behaviours. To elimi-
nate the negative effect of the malicious behaviours, the VCS
system needs to revoke all the pseudonym certificates which
belong to the compromised user. However, the mapping rela-
tionships between the permanent identity and the pseudonym
sets are stored in the PKI. Thus the certificates (pseudonym and
permanent certificates) of the adversary is publicised once the
malicious behaviours have been confirmed.
As a result, our proposed Blockchain based structure could
enable SMs to distributed shuffling the pseudonym and PKI is
capable of keeping the newest mapping between the pseudony-
m and the permanent identity. All SMs are connected with each
other and the PKI on a domain. SMs communication mainly
contains pseudonym shuffling and CRL updating. Similar to
Bitcoin application, the ledger keeps all transactions from the
beginning and is visible to all SMs. Apart from this, all SMs
play the role of miners in exchange for accessing the VCS secu-
rity and privacy services. With this Blockchain based structure,
our system could obtain the latest CRL in the shortest possible
time since the PKI provides the pseudonym certificates from the
latest identity mapping. Finally, the newest CRL is distributed
by RSUs to the vehicle nodes.
4. Blockchain Based Certificate Revocation Scheme
We first introduce the prerequisites of the Blockchain based
scheme, namely the system initialisation and pseudonym shuf-
fling. The certificate revocation scheme is shown in infrastruc-
ture and vehicle scenarios.
5
A. Lei et al. / Future Generation Computer Systems 00 (2019) 1–12 6
4.1. System Initialisation
PKI initialises the system by establishing all the crypto-
graphic materials, include permanent identity, permanent key
pairs, pseudonym sets. We assume these credentials are gen-
erated by PKIs and distributed to car manufacturers and equip-
ment manufacturers which are responsible to produce vehicles
and VCS infrastructures, respectively. All the nodes have their
own permanent identities. Each permanent identity contains the
identity number IDx, certificate CERTx and key pairs (private
key SKx and public key PKx) which are used to prove the real
node identity, where x is the node name. The distribution pro-
cedure between PKI and manufacturers is finalised via highly
secured connections, such as optical fibre connections.
PKIs generate a certain number of pseudonyms off line and
then distributes to vehicles through manufacturer as initial pse-
udonym sets. Each pseudonym set {PN1 · · ·PNn} contains the
corresponding pseudonym certificates {cert1 · · · certn} and pri-
vate/public key pairs {sk1/pk1 · · · skn/pkn}.
4.2. Pseudonym Shuffling
In the proposed Blockchain structure, SMs are responsible
to retrieve the ’used’ pseudonym sets and reallocate these ps-
eudonym sets. When vehicles running on the road, they will
frequently exchange pseudonym followed by certain pseudon-
ym shuffling algorithm. The pseudonym shuffling is supposed
to execute within mixed zones which is a geographic region
within the VCS environment. Generally speaking, the mixed
zone must be selected carefully to maximise the privacy lev-
el. For example, traffic junction, roundabout and temporary car
park will help a lot to mix the privacy related messages by con-
taining a large number of similar status vehicles. In the mixed
zone, each vehicle first cloaks its location information accord-
ing to the specific cloaking algorithm of the mixed zone [8].
This aims to mix all the vehicle so that the tracking probability
can be minimised. The pseudonym shuffling has three steps:
(i) A vehicle changes to a new pseudonym set and marks the
previously enabled pseudonym set as ’used’ if the pseudonym
set meets its expiry conditions. Upon joining the next mixed
zone, the vehicle encapsulates all the used pseudonym sets into
a package and sends to the current SM via an RSU.
(ii) SMs will collect used pseudonym sets for a fixed period
of time and then aggregate all the pseudonyms in a single pack-
age. All the packages are signed by the private key SKSM of
the sender and broadcast to the SM network, hence SMs could
assure all pseudonyms are integrity and authenticated. These
packages are shared within the SM network and each SM tem-
porary stores a copy of the pseudonym sets in the packages. The
stored pseudonym sets are deleted after the pseudonym shuf-
fling finished.
(iii) Due to the fact that every communication between SM-
s contains timestamps, pseudonym shuffling will be triggered
in every fixed interval. When pseudonym shuffling starts, each
SM proposes a method about the pseudonym reallocation plan
and the reallocated pseudonym sets with same destination SM-
s are encapsulated into a single transaction. The pseudonym
sets are represented by indices in order to reduce the size of
the messages. SMs starts the consensus mining algorithm after-
wards, such as calculating the PoW. Whoever first finishes the
mining process must add the mined block into the Blockchai-
n. The SMs know the shuffling results from the transactions in
the mined block. Pseudonym sets are picked according to the
indices in the transactions. Finally, SMs delete the temporarily
stored pseudonym sets in step (ii) to release the storage space.
The shuffling algorithm is demonstrated in Algorithm.1.
Algorithm 1 The Pseudonym Shuffling Scheme
1: for (x = 1; x 6 i; x++) do
2: SMx gathers all the used pseudonyms from mixed zones it manages;
3: PNSMx = {PNS Mx1 · · · PNS Mxnx };
4: Counts the number of used pseudonyms sets = nx;
5: Encapsulates PNSMx into package and sends into SM network;
6: end for
7: for (x = 1; x 6 i; x++) do
8: SMx picks up all the pseudonym package within SM network;
9: Shuffles the sequence of pseudonym sets and reallocates to destination
PMs;
10: Reallocated pseudonym sets which have same destination are encapsu-
lated into a single transaction.
11: Encrypt the pseudonym sets use the private key of the destination SM;
12: end for
13: All the SMs start Mining;
14: The mining winner broadcasts the Block into PM network;
15: for (x = 1; x 6 i; x++) do




We explain our certificate revocation scheme in two level-
s, namely the infrastructure level and vehicle level. The in-
frastructure level based on the pseudonym shuffling scheme in
Algorithm.1 which involves the accountability and CRL distri-
bution, while the revocation on vehicle level is achieved by not
issuing group secret key to the malicious vehicles.
4.3.1. Infrastructure Level
Figure 3. The Message Handshake Of Pseudonym Shuffling Mining
Based on the pseudonym shuffling scheme, the used pseud-
onym sets are sent to SM network so that SMs can propose new
pseudonym allocation plan. According to the network struc-
ture, PKI is placed in a relatively isolated environment, but it
is still connected with SM network and able to receive mes-
sages within SM network. The pseudonym shuffling results are
6
A. Lei et al. / Future Generation Computer Systems 00 (2019) 1–12 7
stored in new blocks and new blocks are broadcasted back to
the network. Afterwards, new blocks are attached behind the
end of the Blockchain and the Blockchain is updated at each
participant SMs simultaneously. In this way, the mechanism of
Blockchain helps to execute shuffling, share and store the re-
sults.
The PKI also captures the mined block after the mined block
broadcasted into the SM network, as shown in Fig.3. Due to the
fact that PKI has the knowledge of all the cryptographic mate-
rials of the network, it is capable of decrypting the transactions
and view the reallocation results. We assume PKI maintains an
identity mapping table between the nodes’ permanent identities
and the corresponding pseudonym sets. The identity mapping
table is updated based on the pseudonym shuffling plans inside
the new blocks so that the latest pseudonym set ownerships are
recorded. The updated mapping table is then distributed to SMs
which have a chance to contact the malicious vehicles. Similar
to the pseudonym shuffling mining processes, the updated map-
ping table is then added to the blocks and distributed via Blo-
ckchain to SMs which have a chance to contact the malicious
vehicles. By processing the above procedures, the accountabil-
ity function can be realised along with the pseudonym shuffling
and the CRL can be distributed using only one broadcast mes-
sage.
As the most critical infrastructure, SMs are assumed to use
secure cable connections. However, the worse things happen
when SM is compromised by attackers. A compromised SM
acts as insider attack to broadcast fake messages, transactions
and blocks. Blockchain gives a good solution to against the
problem: Due to the consensus mechanism of Blockchain, the
computation power of the compromised node must beyond (at
least 51% computation power of the entire network) rest of the
nodes in order to consistently send out forged blocks and to
have them accepted by the Blockchain network. In addition, all
pseudonym sets that the compromised SM received from must
be revoked in order to keep from further using.
Here we illustrate an example of how PKI updates the map-
ping between permanent identities and pseudonym sets by hear-
ing the information inside the mined block. The example is
based on the following three assumptions: (i) There are three
vehicles are currently with the mixed zone which are managed
by SM1. These vehicles have permanent identities ID1, ID2 and
ID3, respectively. (ii) Each vehicle sends out three pseudonym
sets which are marked as ’used’. (iii) The volume of the pse-
udonym set pool in OBUs on the vehicles is set to store max-
imum five pseudonym sets. These assumptions are just used
to assist the expression of the example but not stand the prac-
tice situations. The example is shown in Table.1, three vehicles
are asked to exchange their used pseudonym sets. Each vehicle
Figure 4. SM1 And Its Neighbour Security Domains
gives away three pseudonym sets, the original mapping table in
PKI is shown in Table.1 (a). The SM network executes the pse-
udonym shuffling and the final reallocation plan is shared in the
form of a mined block. PKI decrypted the transaction to SM1
from the mined block, the transaction information is demon-
strated in Table.1 (b). The updated mapping table substitutes
the used pseudonym sets with the reallocated pseudonym sets,
as illustrates in Table.1 (c).
Now the PKI get the latest identity mapping information.
A CRL can be sent from PKI to SM1 and its neighbour SM-
s (e.g. SM0 and SM2 in Fig.4) if any vehicle in the area of
SM1 involving in malicious behaviours. This aims to inform
SMs which have the opportunity to receive the messages from
malicious vehicles.
4.3.2. Vehicle Level
The trustfulness and legality of safety beacon information
are secured by encrypting the beacon message with a pre-agreed
Group Key (GK). As mentioned above, the GK is not given to
the malicious vehicle in order to revoke them. This mechanism
is only used to forbid the malicious involving in normal net-
work messaging, but not actually deletes the cryptographic ma-
terials inside malicious vehicles. Furthermore, by reading the
broadcasted CRLs, nodes on the infrastructure level learn these
cryptographic materials come from malicious users. Therefore,
the remaining cryptographic materials are not capable to further
interface the network. The major task of key management at the
vehicle level is distributing GK to the authorised vehicles. The
membership list of each communication group changes dynam-
ically, hence GK must be updated and redistributed whenever
membership changes to provide forward and backward secrecy.
Forward secrecy is a mechanism to prevent the departing user
from understanding future group broadcast, while backward se-
crecy means that a fresh member can’t obtain information from
previous messages. The procedures to update and redistributed
GK to the communication participants are called rekeying. In
our previous contribution [14], we manage keys based on the
Table 1. An Example of Updating The Identity Mapping Table
Original Mapping Table Transaction for S M1 Updated Mapping Table
Permanent ID No. Pseudonym Sets Dest Vehicle ID Pseudonym Sets Permanent ID No. Pseudonym Sets
ID1 PN1, PN2, PN3, PN4, PN5 ID1 PN6, PN7, PN11 ID1 PN4, PN5, PN6∗, PN7∗, PN11∗
ID2 PN6, PN7, PN8, PN9, PN10 → ID2 PN1, PN12, PN13 → ID2 PN1∗, PN9, PN10, PN12∗, PN13∗
ID3 PN11, PN12, PN13, PN14, PN15 ID3 PN2, PN3, PN8 ID3 PN2∗, PN3∗, PN8∗, PN14, PN15
(a) (b) (c)
∗: The updated pseudonym sets
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key tree approach. key tree approach structure [37] [38] is one
of the most protruding group key management structures. The
GK is placed at the root of the tree and user nodes are sepa-
rated at the termination of branches. Logical key tree bifurca-
tion points are introduced into the key tree approach with corre-
sponding secret keys (Key Encryption Key, KEK) on them. An
example of key tree approach is shown in Figure.5. The most
significant advantage of LKH is the scalability: For a d−degree
LKH tree with N nodes, the communication overhead for each
group rekeying is d logd N.
Figure 5. A Typical Structure Of The Key Tree Approach
The safety beacon message consists of a piece of safety
information which is encrypted with GK, a digital signature
and certificate. A receiver will not read the safety informa-
tion before the correctness of all these three digital receipts are
checked. The final object of certificate revocation is to preven-
t vehicles from reading the safety beacon messages with fake
information inside. For this reason, SMs can finalise the certifi-
cate revocation by not issuing valid GK to the malicious user.
For example in Figure.5, user U1 is found involving in mali-
cious behaviours. The next rekeying messages should update
users with new secret keys, excluding U1, as shown below:
Enc{KEKnew00 , KEKnew0 ,GKnew}PKU2 → U2
Enc{KEKnew0 ,GKnew}KEK01 → U3,U4
Enc{GKnew}KEK1 → U5,U6,U7,U8
4.4. Accountability Report
To realise the certificate revocation function, the revocation
system should have a mechanism to report the malicious be-
haviour to the PKI. RSUs in [30] [32] [33] are designed to send
a dedicated message to PKI in order to report the malicious ac-
tions. Alternatively, we propose to embed the accountability re-
port function within either the key management scheme in [13]
or the pseudonym shuffling scheme, aiming to reduce the com-
munication overhead. Based on the above idea, SM encounter
communications with the SM network under two situations: (i)
The system needs to shuffle the pseudonym sets to protect pri-
vacy. (ii) The system has key handover requirements. Consid-
er VCS covers multiple security domains and large number of
vehicle nodes, these two situations happen frequently (no less
than one times per second [13]). The proposed accountability
report mechanism starts with the initial malicious behaviour de-
tection. SM waits for the next communication opportunity with
the SM network before sends out all the collected malicious re-
port. Finally, the PKI receives the reports and starts the CRL
distribution task. A complete certificate revocation procedures
are displayed in Algorithm.2
Algorithm 2 The Certificate Revocation Procedures For PKI
and SMs
Algorithm For PKI:
1: Hear messages in the SM network;
2: if (New Block Comes In the SM Network) then
3: Update mapping between permanent identity and pseudonym sets;
4: else if (New Messages Contains Report Of Malicious Behaviours) then;
5: Look up the mapping of the malicious user;
6: Prepare the updated CRL;
7: Find SMs around the malicious user SM = {SM1 · SMn};




11: SM hears messages from SM network and RSUs;
12: if (New Messages Contains Report Of Malicious Behaviours) then
13: Packet the report into a package with other messages;
14: if (New Time Slot Of Forwarding Messages Starts) then
15: Forward the Package to SM network;
16: end if
17: else if (New CRL From PKI then












Payload: (Encrypted Transaction Information)
Ciphertext = Enc{Information}PKS M−dest
Table.2 shows the format of each transaction in the block
which contains transaction header and payload. In the trans-
action header, the number of this transaction gives the position
where the transaction locates in the Blockchain. Transaction
type indicates the purpose of the transaction, either the privacy
preserving or security reinforcement. the source and destina-
tion SM address are similar to bitcoin input and output [12].
The signature occupies the last position of the transaction to
maintain the authentication, integrity, and non-repudiation of
key transfer information.
Table 3. The Format of Block
Block Header
Field Description
Version Block Version Number
Previous Block Hash Hash of the previous block in the chain
Merkle Tree Root Hash of the merkle tree root RootM
Timestamp Creation time of this block
Consensus Receipt Information about the consensus algorithm
Block Payload (Transactions)
Transaction No.1 · · · Transaction No.n
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The block is designed for containing all transactions and
attaching it into blockchain. The format of a block is shown
in Table.3. The first row shows the block number which is
the sequence number of the whole Blockchain. The previous
block hash links this block to its parent one. This hash structure
makes blocks attached with each and generates a chain struc-
ture. The Merkle tree root is used for securing the transaction-
s integrity [39]. All transactions in this block are joined into
the Merkle tree root, so that any alteration on any transactions
would cause a different value of Merkle root value. Similarly to
bitcoin, we add a timestamp to prove that this block of transac-
tions has existed and to prevent from time tempering. The con-
sensus receipt field includes the digital materials to calculate
and verify the consensus algorithm, the targeted difficulty and
nonce are illustrated if the current Blockchain uses the proof of
work algorithm [16]. The payload field contains the aforemen-
tioned transactions that the block creator randomly allocated.
4.6. Consensus algorithm
The nature of consensus in Blockchain is a distributed way
to establish an agreement between a group of nodes, instead
of relying on the central manager’s decision. The most well
known consensus method is Proof of Work (PoW) which is cal-
culated by trying multiple hushes. The PoW system originally
was proposed for being able to deter spam email. All proof-of-
work applications (e.g bitcoin) require participated nodes con-
tribute a significant amount of computation power to obtain a
digital proof that can be verified easily. The procedure that
nodes contribute their computation power to solve the mathe-
matical question and obtain the proof of work is called mining.
Whoever that solved the question first is able to attach its block
into the chain. In this paper, consensus algorithm mainly used
to distribute decide pseudonym shuffling plan among SMs and
record the most updated mapping between pseudonym sets and
permanent identities in new blocks. The PoW with low diffi-
culty is proposed in this approach as all the SMs have identical
processing modules inside and they are assumed to link with
highly secured wire connections. The low difficulty allows a
short PoW computation time, resulting in efficient consensus.
5. Performance Evaluation
The performance evaluation of the proposed certificate re-
vocation scheme was carried out using simulations. The sim-
ulations enforce the revocation processes to produce the final
results. The performances are quantified by measuring the sys-
tem efficiency of the proposed scheme comparing to the bench-
mark. Performance evaluation analyses the system efficiency in
two parts:
Proecssing Time: This part includes the handshake pro-
cessing time to process accountability and revocation.
Overhead: The comparison of message overhead and pro-
cessing time between the Blockchain structure and the tradi-
tional structure is demonstrated as another metric. The CRL
distribution benchmarks are based on the X.509 [29] and opti-
mised X.509 CRL in [40].
Finally, a brief analysis of the capability to support security
services within the Blockchain network is illustrated.
5.1. Simulation Assumptions
Our result is generated using OMNeT++ 4.5 [41][42] with
the dedicated network simulation (Veins) packet [42]. Elliptic
Curve Integrated Encryption Scheme (ECIES)[43] with elliptic
curve secp160r1 in Crypto++ [44] is selected not only for cryp-
tographic scheme ECIES, but Elliptic Curve Digital Signature
Algorithm (ECDSA) as well. Cipher block has a length of 75
bytes which is because ECIES provides much better security
level. 20 bytes are used to store the security and privacy infor-
mation in transactions. Due to the fact that SMs are trusted en-
tities, the PoW mining difficulty of each block is set to 3 which
allows a short PoW computation time, resulting in efficient con-
sensus. We simulated that blocks are mined by our laptop with
Intel Core i5 and 8GB RAM and display card GeForce 920M.
This device can complete 250K hash calculations per second.
Other parameters come from VCS standards [3] and [5], in-
cluding using frequency of 5.9 GHz and safety beacon message
frequency 10 times per second.
5.2. Certificate Revocation List Size
The CRL size in the X.509 CRL [29] defines that each entry
in the ’Revoked Certificates’ field consists of 39 bytes, includ-
ing a long serial number of revoked certificate, revocation date
and revocation reason for 6 bytes, 13 bytes and 12 bytes, re-
spectively. The mandatory fixed fields in X.509 CRL occupies
400 bytes [40]. This CRL is initially broadcasted to the infras-
tructures (SM or RSU) and next distributed to vehicles via RSU
access points. An optimised X.509 CRL scheme in [40] propos-
es to compress the size of mandatory fixed fields in X.509 CRL
so that only 39 bytes are needed for each revocation element.
Based on the pseudonym shuffling and certificate revocation al-
gorithms in Section 4.2 and Section 4.3, SMs use the indices to
reduce the message size. Moreover, the mandatory fixed field-
s are removed since our CRLs only circulate among the VCS
infrastructure network which consists of trust nodes. We refer
to the information size in [29], each certificate index requires
6 bytes (the long serial number). The CRL in the Blockchain
based scheme is only distributed among VCS infrastructures.
Therefore, the total size of X.509 based CRL schemes and our
proposed CRL can be calculated as follows, we assume nrevoked
is the number of revoked certificates:
Among VCS Infrastructures:
X.509 CRL size = (400 + nrevoked× 39) bytes
Optimiesed X.509 CRL size = nrevoked× 38 bytes
Blockchain Based scheme CRL size = nrevoked× 6 bytes
Among Vehicles:
X.509 CRL size = (400 + nrevoked× 39) bytes
Optimiesed X.509 CRL size = nrevoked× 38 bytes
Blockchain Based scheme CRL size = 0
The sizes of the X.509 CRL, optimised X.509 CRL in [40]
and the CRL in Blockchain based scheme are shown in Fig.6
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Figure 6. CRL Size Among Infrastructures In Terms Of Vehicle Number
Figure 7. CRL Size Among Vehicles In Terms Of Vehicle Number
and Fig.7 regarding to different number of vehicles and certifi-
cate revocation rates. The upper and the lower amounts of the
vehicle are considered between 50,000 to half million, which
is considered to cover most traffic conditions. Two revocation
rate, 10% and 5% are assumed to provide a various number
of revocation requests. Fig.6 shows CRL sizes among infras-
tructure network, optimised scheme in [40] achieves minor im-
provement comparing to the X.509 CRL as it deletes some re-
dundancy fields in the CRL header. The proposed scheme de-
creases the CRL size significantly comparing to the X.509 CR-
L scheme. The results of X.509 CRL sizes are approximately
eight times of the results in Blockchain based scheme which
is because the X.509 CRL introduces too many profile field-
s, such as mandatory fields, reason code and revocation proof
[40]. Due to the fact that the vehicle level revocation in the B-
lockchain based scheme is realised by removing the malicious
user out of the communication group, thus the CRL is only dis-
tributed to the infrastructure level, resulting zero CRL size on
the vehicle level. The CRL sizes in vehicle level are illustrated
in Fig.7.
5.3. Revocation Overhead And Processing Time
A comparison of the communication handshake procedures
between the X.509 CRL, optimised X.509 CRL and the Bloc-
kchain based certificate revocation scheme is shown in Fig.8.
In the traditional X.509 certificate revocation scheme and the
optimised X.509 CRL scheme in [40], a report about the ma-
licious behaviour is sent to the PKI to check and prepare the
Figure 8. Handshake Procedures Of The Certificate Revocation Schemes
CRL. PKI sends back the updated CRL to RSUs through SM.
Finally RSUs are responsible for distributing the CRL to ve-
hicles, as shown in Fig.8(a). In Fig.8(b), different from the
X.509 scheme, the Blockchain based scheme embeds the mali-
cious report within the other service messages which are sent to
SM network by SMs. Furthermore, RSU does not need to dis-
tribute CRL to vehicles as the malicious user is excluded from
the group key management. Due to the fact that the message
overhead increases linearly in terms of the growing number of
revocation broadcast, the Blockchain based certificate revoca-
tion scheme reduces one-third of the message overheads com-
paring to the X.509 based schemes among the infrastructure
level. Furthermore, our proposed scheme achieves zero mes-
sage overhead which is caused by CRL distribution.
Table 4. The Overhead Comparison Between CRL Schemes
Scenario Scheme Overhead/CRL Distribution
Infrastructure Level
X.509 CRL (Fig.8(a)) 3 Broadcasts
CRL in [40] (Fig.8(a)) 3 Broadcasts
Blockchain-CRL (Fig.8(b)) 2 Broadcasts
Vehicle Level
X.509 CRL (Fig.8(a)) 1 Broadcast
CRL in [40] (Fig.8(a)) 1 Broadcasts
Blockchain-CRL (Fig.8(b)) 0 Broadcast
The message overhead for the infrastructure and vehicle
levels are shown in Table.4, we can see the X.509 based scheme
cost an extra handshake step on the infrastructure level in order
to report the malicious behaviour to PKI, while the Blockchain
based scheme removes this step by meriting the report with oth-
er messages. Similar to the infrastructure level, the Blockchain
base scheme revokes malicious user by not containing it to the
communication group, thus there has no CRL broadcast step in
vehicle level.
Table 5. Average Cryptography Processing Time [13]





Based on the message handshake procedures in Fig.8, in or-
der to assure message integrity and authenticity, each message
exchange involves signature verification, signature generation,
ciphertext decryption and encryption. Table.5 records the time
cost to process ECC-based cryptographic schemes on our com-
puter. Generally speaking, messages should be encrypted and
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attached a digital signature before it is sent to the next node.
The receiver checks the correctness of the signature, decrypts
the ciphertext to process the message if receives a new mes-
sage. Therefore, the traditional network needs 4 encryptions,
signings, verifications and decryptions to finish one CRL distri-
bution process, overall costs 11.4482 milliseconds, while the B-
lockchain based scheme only requires half of the efforts (5.7241
ms).
5.4. Time Cost To Update CRL
Two reasons that the proposed scheme gives fewer message
overheads are the efficient CRL updating mechanism and the
malicious reports which are embedded with other service mes-
sages. Although the mechanisms help to optimise the certificate
revocation performance, the impacts on the VCS network still
need to be discussed.
Figure 9. Time Cost From Transaction Broadcast To Block Broadcast
As mentioned in Section 4, the PKI updates the CRL by lis-
tening to the mined block from the SM network, thus the pro-
cessing time to generate a block is considered. The processing
time consists of message propagation, block preparation, min-
ing and cryptographic materials preparation. We acquire each
time component from our previous contribution [13] and cal-
culate the result of total time cost to update CRLs in PKI. As
can be seen in Fig.9 the total time increases exponentially when
the transaction number grows. The results are count from the
transactions first joining the network to the mined block broad-
casting back to SM network. The Blockchain base system can
support 600 and 1000 transactions within one and two seconds,
respectively.
Table 6. The Number Of Roads Can Blockchain System Support
Vehicles Vehicles Malicious Vehicles Roads Can Support
/hour/road Handover/Sec Report/Sec /Mixed Zone 1 Sec 2 Sec
3,000 0.83 0.08 4 122.2 171.82
6,000 1.67 0.17 8 60.97 85.62
9,000 2.50 0.25 12 40.68 57.14
12,000 3.33 0.33 16 30.52 42.88
15,000 4.16 0.42 20 24.41 34.29
The number of roads which can be supported by Blockcha-
in system are considered as metric to measure the performance,
as shown in Table.6. The last two columns are the results under
Blockchain mining frequency of one and two seconds. Consid-
ering the rush hours have 15,000 vehicles passing a highway
each hour in Beijing, the busiest city in the world [13], which
means there have an average four key handover transactions.
Meanwhile the off peak hours have only 3000 vehicles passing
a highway in one hour. We evaluate the maximum certificate
revocation rate of 10%. Here assume during rush hours there
has mixed zone on each road (e.g. traffic light, roundabout,
etc.) and 20 vehicles within the mixed zone who require to
change their pseudonym sets. For lower traffic levels the num-
ber of vehicles within mixed zone decrease proportionally. To
this account, around 25 transactions are forwarded to the SM
network per second per road during rush hours. That means
the Blockchain based system is capable to support the security,
privacy and revocation services for approximately 25 highways
in one second and 34 highways in two seconds. From another
perspective, the network burden caused by reporting the mali-
cious behaviour occupies no more than 4% of the Blockchain
resources which is considered as an acceptable range.
6. Conclusion
In this paper, a novel certificate revocation scheme for pre-
venting insider attacks in VCS networks is proposed. Our scheme
introduces Blockchain concept and reduces the CRL size and
the broadcast message overheads. The proposed Blockchain
structure allows the PKI to keep tracing the ownership of pseu-
donym sets and distribute the CRL in an efficient manner. We
developed an effective malicious behaviour report mechanism.
Part of the CRL distribution is combined with the group key
management scheme to minimise the message overhead of cer-
tificate revocation. Two CRL scenarios are discussed separate-
ly, namely the infrastructure level and the vehicle level. We first
studied the CRL sizes of different schemes which prove the B-
lockchain base scheme is capable to significantly compress the
size of CRL. Secondly, by analysing the message handshake
procedures between infrastructures and vehicles in VCS, our
Blockchain structure achieves more efficiency and robustness
compared to the traditional structure since the Blockchain pro-
vides a distributed network structure. The results of message
overheads between certificate revocation scheme demonstrate
the Blockchain based scheme releases the communication bur-
den by reducing the overall number of broadcast messages.
Our future work focuses to further take optimise the entire
Blockchain network, including the investigation of more effi-
cient consensus algorithm and further analysis of the combi-
nation of security, privacy and accountability. In the future,
the extension of our work aims to analysis with additional per-
formance measurements, including but not limited at message
latency, delivery ratio, identity tracking probability and compu-
tation overhead. Moreover, our future work should involve a
complete performance evaluation so that users are able to de-
cide the trade-off between security and privacy.
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